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Blackburn’s Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism: Revisited 
I 
In his famous argument Blackburn (1970/923), 1984, 1985/93) tries to show the untenability 
of moral realism, specifically moral naturalism (or at least, its inferiority to his own quasi-
realism). The argument is that there is no conceptual entailment from satisfying a naturalistic 
predicate, however complex, to satisfying a moral predicate; no a priori knowable route from 
the first to the second. But it is a priori knowable that two subjects of predication cannot 
differ morally without differing naturalistically; the moral is conceptually supervenient on the 
natural. However, this bare conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural (the 
conjunction of conceptual supervenience with lack of conceptual entailment), is something 
the non-realist can explain, but the realist cannot. 
 I argue for two theses. The first is that Blackburn’s best formulation of his challenge 
is his first one.1 Subsequently he reformulates it as a demand for the realist to explain a ‘ban 
on mixed worlds’. Many critics have directed their arguments against this formulation but 
they are ineffective against Blackburn’s first formulation of the challenge, as briefly set out 
above. Nonetheless, my second thesis is, even when it is so formulated the realist can meet 
the challenge. The bare conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural can be given a 
realist explanation. This can be done by understanding names of moral properties as 
descriptive names (in the sense of Evans 1979) of natural properties.2 
 
1 Strictly speaking it is not necessary for Blackburn to present the general thesis of the bare 
conceptual thesis of the moral on the natural as the explanandum in his challenge. He can 
simply take an instance of the thesis, with a particular moral predicate, e.g., ‘is a virtuous 
character trait’, and demand the realist explain the instance. All he needs to claim victory is 
one explanatory failure from his opponent. 
2 To avoid the supervenience thesis being a triviality, natural properties must be understood 
to be multiply instantiable. But this leaves a lot of scope. Predicates expressing them can still 
refer to spatiotemporal locations. It is not a priori that two things cannot have the same origin, 
or even be at all times coincident (these are matters of philosophical dispute). Natural 
properties can also be relational, and the class for our purposes includes psychological 
properties. It also includes such complex relational-cum-psychological properties as being 




There are (at least) four ways the realist can try to meet Blackburn’s challenge. First, he 
might try to deny the bare conceptual supervenience claimed by denying the lack of 
conceptual entailment. Secondly, he might concede it but say that it does not ensure the 
metaphysical possibility of two worlds alike in all natural respects but differing morally. In 
other words, he might say that there is not only, what Blackburn insists upon, metaphysical 
intraworld supervenience, but also metaphysical interworld supervenience, which Blackburn 
is required to deny. Thirdly, he might argue that the non-realist is no more capable of 
explaining bare conceptual convenience than he is. Fourthly, he might accept that everything 
Blackburn says in his original paper is true, embrace Blackburn’s bare supervenience thesis 
as correct, but offer a realist explanation of it. 
 In what follows I will be discussing only the second and fourth realist responses. My 
first thesis, argued for in this section, is that the second response fails by targeting an inferior 
formulation of Blackburn’s challenge. My second thesis is that the fourth response can be 
implemented successfully. 
 The second realist response is probably the most popular in the literature.3 What 
motivates it is Blackburn’s subsequent restatement of his initial challenge as a demand for an 
explanation of the ‘ban on mixed worlds’. In his initial formulation Blackburn presents his 
challenge as above. He does not talk of (mixed) worlds. Later, having lost his pre-Kripkean 
 
to individuals. So the class can include such properties as being amusing to Donald Trump or 
being commanded by Odin or forbidden by Zeus. For the purpose of this discussion then (as 
Blackburn himself states) natural properties can include supernatural ones, and divine 
command theories of morality are a subspecies of natural ones. (Though it is, of course, a 
reasonable question whether someone who holds that two token actions might differ morally 
though the only difference between them is that one is commanded by Odin and the other 
forbidden by him understands moral vocabulary any better than someone who thinks that the 
only relevant moral difference might be that one is amusing to Trump and the other not. And 
if it is agreed that these differences can make no moral difference but said that being 
commanded by e.g., the Christian God can, then perhaps some more explanation is needed.) 
3 See Klagge (1984), McFetridge (1985), Shoemaker (1987), Dreir (1992), Zangwill (1995), 
Bloomfield (2001), Sobel (2001) and Majors (2009). 
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innocence, in his book Spreading the Word (1984) and later he does. He states the bare 
supervenience thesis as the thesis that there is B*/A supervenience without B*/A necessity, 
where the A properties are the moral ones and B* is a complete naturalistic specification of a 
thing. He thinks of B*/A supervenience as an intraworld affair and thinks that the lack of 
B*/A necessity means that there are metaphysically possible worlds in which B* things are A 
and worlds in which B* things are not A. What is ruled out by B*/A supervenience is just 
‘mixed worlds’, ones in which some things that are B* are A and some things that are B* are 
not A. But, he argues, the moral realist cannot explain this. He ‘has a concept of an actual 
moral state of affairs, which might or might not distribute in a particular way across the 
naturalistic states. Supervenience [and hence the ban on mixed worlds] thus becomes a 
mysterious fact, and one of which he will have no explanation (or no right to rely on). It 
would be as though some people are [N and doing the right thing], and others are [N but 
doing the wrong thing] but there is a ban on them travelling to the same place; completely 
inexplicable’ (1984: 185-6). 
 The standard response to Blackburn, then, is simply that there is interworld 
supervenience as well as intraworld supervenience, so it is not the case that all that are ruled 
out are mixed worlds. As Shoemaker (1987:440) puts it: ‘Blackburn is trying to explain a 
non-fact’. 
 Shoemaker develops his point as follows: 
Much of our practical evaluation of things are of things that are not actual, and we 
regularly have to compare hypothetical situations with one another and with actual 
ones. And when it would be absurd to say that one actual B* situation is morally good 
and that another is morally bad, it would be equally absurd to say that an actual one is 
morally good and a merely possible one is bad, or that one possible one is good and 
another different possible one is bad…. In the case of values B*/A supervenience 
holds across possible worlds as well as within…; so … it entails B/* necessity. 
Blackburn says … ‘Whereas it seems conceptually … necessary that if two things 
share a total basis of natural properties, then they have the same moral properties. ‘it 
does not seem a matter of conceptual … necessity that any given total natural state of 
a thing gives it some particular moral property’. But … what is not conceptually 
necessary is the conditional ‘If x is B* then x is A’. What is conceptually necessary is 
not only the intraworld supervenience principle Blackburn has in mind … but also the 
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interworld supervenience principle ‘If there is a world w in which something is B* 
and A, then in any world w', if something in w' is B * that thing is A’. In virtue of the 
truth of the latter, the conditional ‘if x is B* then x is A’ will be necessarily true, 
although not conceptually true if anything in any possible world is B* and A. … since 
it is a commonplace that that there are ‘metaphysical necessities’ that are not 
conceptual necessities, we should not be surprised to find one here. 
Dreir (1992:15) appeals to Hare’s example of St Francis of Assisi to argue that we 
must recognise the interworld supervenience of the moral on the natural: 
…. We assume [St Francis] to be a very good man. We know from WS [intraworld 
supervenience]4 that anyone just like Francis in every naturalistic respect is also good. 
… What we now want to know is whether any possible person who was just like 
Francis in every  naturalistic respect would be good … it seems that anyone who 
denied that would exhibit a linguistic or logical deficiency. 
 I think all this shows merely that second thoughts are not always better, Blackburn’s 
original formulation does not talk of possible people, situations or worlds or metaphysical 
necessities (that are not conceptual necessities). So a defender of his challenge can just repeat 
it in the original terms and demand that the realist explain bare supervenience, so understood, 
or justify the contention that, as Shoemaker describes the ‘ban on mixed worlds’, it is also a 
non-fact. 
 The defender of early Blackburn need not say any more on the point, I think, but he 
reasonably can. The reference to (merely) possible people and situations by Blackburn and 
Dreir should give us pause. It could have been that there was a fat man jammed in the 
doorway, to use Quine’s famous example. Does that mean that there is a possible fat man 
jammed in the doorway? We do talk of possible Fs, but do we do so in a way that helps us to 
understand the passages quoted? I could have won the lottery last week. I had a ticket last 
week (I do not indulge every week). So last week I was a possible lottery winner. But, alas, 
 
4 Dreir distinguishes (where ‘F’ ranges over moral properties and ‘G’ over natural ones) (WS) 
‘Necessarily for any F, if Fx then there is a G, Gx and for any y, if Gy then Fy’ from 
interworld supervienience (SS) ‘Necessarily for any F, if Fx then there is a G, Gx and 




only a merely possible one. A merely possible lottery winner is not a lottery winner who is 
possible but not actual, but just an (actual) person who could have been (but wasn’t) a lottery 
winner. One way of understanding talk of possible Fs is as talk of (actual) things that could 
have been Fs. But can the talk in Dreir of a possible person who was just like St Francis in all 
naturalistic respects be understood in this way? I could have been a person like St Francis in 
all naturalistic respects (if we reject the thesis of the necessity of origin, and other 
controversial theses about identity across worlds which do not seem relevant here). I am 
therefore a possible person like St Francis in all naturalistic respects, just as last week I was a 
possible lottery winner. But I am not a good man. Does this refute any thesis of the 
supervenience of the moral on the natural? No. I am not naturalistically indiscernible from St 
Francis. It is not clear what other notion of ‘a possible person who …’ Drier is using. And it 
is also not clear whether what Dreir wishes to say is more than that it would not be possible 
for a person to be naturalistically just like Francis and not be good. 
 These familiar thoughts might make us hesitate about the distinction between 
intraworld and interworld supervenience this objection to Blackburn appeals to. In addition, if 
talk of possible worlds is rejected as merely metaphorical and/or reducible (reasonably 
enough, following Kripke’s (1980) admonitions) the distinction between them must be made 
(as Dreir does) by the absence/presence of an embedded modal operator. 
Intraworld Supervenience 
It is conceptually necessary that, for any x, for any y, if for any natural property N, Nx iff Ny, 
then for any moral property M, Mx iff My 
Interworld Supervenience 
It is conceptually necessary that: for any M, if for some x, Mx then for some N, Nx and it is 
metaphysically necessary that for any y, if Ny then My. 
 But the defender of early Blackburn can say that the latter is problematic in at least 
two ways: it embeds a metaphysical necessity operator, which makes no sense since talk of 
metaphysical necessity has point only if there are necessary a posteriori truths – but there 
aren’t; and it involves (second order) quantification into that metaphysical context from 
without, which also makes no sense. He can call on such authorities as Quine, Dummett and 
Lewis in support of these claims. Of course, all this can be denied. The point is merely that 
the appeal to the intraworld/interworld distinction which the standard objection to Blackburn 
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makes is not unproblematic. There is a defensible position that the formulation of the 
supervenience of the moral on the natural as an interworld principle constitutes a confused 
attempt to capture the conceptual constraint governing moral discourse.5 
 But how then should the supervenience claim, in its full generality, be understood? 
Lewis has an answer. Everyone’s first thought is right. A (moral) properties supervene on B 
(naturalistic) properties just in call all things alike in B properties are alike in A properties – 
all things. The quantification is unrestricted.6 
 If we accept this Blackburn’s 1971 bare conceptual supervenience thesis can be 
restated without reference to any non-epistemic modality. (i) All things alike in the natural 
predicates they satisfy are alike in the moral predicates they satisfy, and this is a priori 
knowable. However, (ii) given any naturalistic predicate, however, complex, and any moral 
predicate, it is not a priori knowable that if something satisfies the former it satisfies the 
latter. This is what the realist is challenged to explain. 
III 
I turn now to my proposed explanation. I say that it sufficient, but also necessary, for the 
realist to meet Blackburn’s challenge that names of moral properties are Evansian descriptive 
names (equivalently, rigidified descriptions) part of whose meaning is that they are names of 
natural properties, and that moral predicates are ones which are a priori equivalent to ones 
which embed names of moral properties. 
 
5 This is also argued by Miller (2018) appealing to Kant’s critique of the ontological 
argument. 
6 See Lewis (1986: 17). Lewis writes: ‘The original simple statement of supervenience is the 
right one, in all cases: there could be no difference of one sort without a difference of the 
other sort. What got us into trouble was to insist on reading the ‘could’ as a diamond … the 
real effect seems to be to unrestrict quantifiers’. His statement of the general form of a 
supervenience claim is: ‘Among all the worlds, or all the things in all the worlds … there is 
no difference of one sort without a difference of the other sort’. The quantification over 
worlds here is eliminable since every world is in (is a part of) itself. Secondly, Lewis would 
remove the restriction to things in worlds in giving a fully general statement of a 
supervenience thesis since he acknowledges the existence of things not in worlds, transworld 
individuals, with parts in several worlds. 
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 So I begin with Evans’s idea of a descriptive name. Evans introduces ‘Julius’ as a 
descriptive name of the inventor of the zip, who, in fact, was Whitcomb L. Judson (WLJ). 
This is a descriptive name in Evans’s sense since a competent user must regard it as a priori 
that Julius is the inventor.7 By contrast ‘WLJ’ is not a descriptive name, but a natural name 
since there is no description (other than one embedding that name) which the competent user 
must a priori associate with it (or so we are told by Kripke). The crucial features of ‘Julius’ 
for our purpose is that it is a (de jure) rigid designator of WLJ, but that it is not a priori 
knowable that Julius=WLJ (since it is a priori that Julius is the inventor but not a priori that 
WLJ is). Hence, it is not a priori knowable that an acquaintance of WLJ is an acquaintance of 
Julius, but it is a priori knowable that two people with the same acquaintances (given by a list 
of natural names) are such that if one of them is an acquaintance of Julius the other is. 
 Trivially, then, it follows, using the notion of conceptual entailment, that there is no 
conceptual entailment from satisfying a predicate of the form ‘ has all and only N1 … Nn as 
acquaintances (where the Ni are all natural names) to satisfying the predicate ‘is an 
acquaintance of Julius’. Although it is knowable a priori, given the meaning of ‘Julius’ that 
two people with the same acquaintances must either both or neither be acquaintances of 
Julius. 
 Of course, this has the same form as the bare conceptual supervenience thesis with 
which Blackburn challenges the moral realist. So we have a model form of explanation the 
moral realist can appeal to. 
 We can run through the same explanatory story with ‘Julius’ replaced by the rigidified 
description ‘the actual inventor of the zip’. 
 Before seeing how the moral realist can use this model to answer Blackburn’s 
challenge we can warm up by considering the case of secondary properties. This application 
is suggested by Kripke in Naming and Necessity in fn. 71 and the corresponding text, but it is 
in tension with Kripke’s main line of thought which is that names of natural kinds of 
 
7 Hence sentences of the form ‘Julius is F’ and ‘The inventor of the zip is F’ have same 
assertoric content but differ in ingredient sense (Dummett: 1973: 446ff.); one makes the same 
claim about the world whichever one uses, but because ‘Julius’ is a name and hence rigid 




phenomena as well as names of natural kind of thing and natural kinds of stuff are analogous 
to natural names of people and other individuals, not to descriptive names and not a priori 
linked to any description (not embedding the name). But suppose ‘heat’ is a descriptive name    
of a secondary property whose a priori reference-fixing description is of the form ‘that 
physical property of physical objects which causes such-and-such a sensation (sensation S) in 
us’. Then, if8 this is so, and this descriptive name denotes, if in fact there is a physical 
property of physical objects which is the physical property of physical objects which causes 
this effect in us, and it is in fact the physical property a physical object has when its parts are 
in motion, what the name names is that property. But there is no a priori knowable route from 
a thing’s being a possessor of the property having its molecules in motion to its being a 
possessor of the property heat. But it can be ruled out a priori, given that this is what ‘heat’ 
means, that physical objects possessing the same physical properties can be such that one is a 
possessor of the property of heat and the other not. This is because, to repeat, we are 
assuming that ‘heat’ means ‘the (actual) physical property of physical objects which causes 
…’, and we are assuming that this description denotes. So if ‘is hot’ is defined to mean ‘is a 
possessor of the property of heat’ it is conceptually ruled out that two physical objects which  
are possessors of all the same physical properties might differ in that one is hot and the other 
not. But it is not a priori knowable that if a thing’s molecules are in motion it is hot. 
 Of course, we could understand ‘heat’ differently. We might simple define it as 
synonymous with the description which fixes its reference on the proposal just given. Then 
‘heat’ would be a flexible designator and so it would be correct to say that if we were 
constituted differently, so not sensitive to molecular motion in the way we in fact are, 
molecular motion would not be heat, but perhaps something else would be. On this 
understanding the meaning of ‘heat’ would be response-dependent. But given that we 
understand ‘heat’ as a descriptive name, and so as a rigid designator, whose reference is fixed 
by the description ‘the physical property of physical objects which cause in us sensation S’ it 
would not be correct to say that if we were not sensitive to molecular motion it would not be 
heat. Rather, it would be correct to say that in such circumstances we would not be sensitive 
to heat. So if ‘heat’ is a descriptive name with the meaning suggested its meaning is not 
response-dependent, but merely response-enabled. 
 
8 I stress that this is a big ‘if’. The example is merely hypothetical. I explain in the final 
section why I do not accept it. 
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 This response-dependent/response-enabled distinction comes from Yablo (2002), 
elaborated by Dohrn (2018). They illustrate with the example of shapes. Shapes are objects 
defined by their mathematical description. The circle is the shape defined by the equation of a 
circle. Suppose we introduce the name ‘the oval’ as a descriptive name of that shape which 
causes a certain a certain visual sensation in us – which looks egg-shaped. The name is tied a 
priori to that description, but it is a rigid designator of the shape, which is defined by a certain 
complex mathematical description, M. So it is a priori that the oval is the shape instantiations 
of which look egg-shaped to us. But although the oval is the shape with mathematical 
description M, there is no conceptual entailment from possessing the shape M to possessing 
the shape oval. However, it is knowable a priori that if two objects are identical in shape (as 
defined by their mathematical description) each possesses the shape, oval, or neither does. 
Hence, if ‘is oval’ is a predicate of material objects defined to mean ‘is an instance of the 
oval’ it is not conceptually guaranteed that if something is an instance of shape M it is oval, 
but it is conceptually guaranteed that if two objects are instances of the same shape (defined 
mathematically) either is oval if the other is. Again we have a case of bare conceptual 
supervenience. 
 Yablo and Dohrn apply their idea to the case of moral predicates in a defence of 
Humean sentimentalism. We can now see how, using these considerations, a naturalist can 
respond to Blackburn. 
 Hume gives two definitions of causation. One as a philosophical relation: 
We may define a CAUSE as an object precedent and contiguous to another, and 
where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of precedency 
and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter (1978: 170). 
And once as a natural relation: 
A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that 
the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the 
impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other (1978: 170). 
 It seems clear enough what is going on. According to Hume, there are two things to 
be taken into account in explaining causation. There is, on the one hand, what is going on in 
the world, independently of its effect on any observer, and there is also, on the other hand, 
10 
 
what goes on in the mind of a (human) observer (one of us) who is prompted to apply the 
concept of causation to the world. 
 The case is parallel, in Hume’s view, in the case of moral and aesthetic properties. 
Here too there is that in the world to which we respond and there is our response, and so a 
similar dual definition is possible. In fact, Hume offers precisely such a pair of definitions of 
virtue, or personal merit, in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. On the one 
hand, he says: ‘Personal merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful 
or agreeable to the person himself or to others’ (1975: 267). On the other hand, he asserts: 
‘the hypothesis we embrace is plain … It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or 
quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation’ (1975: 289). 
 According to Hume the primary bearers of personal merit or demerit are enduring 
mental qualities, or traits of character. So virtue is a property of personal qualities; it is a 
property of properties. So following Hume let us fix the reference of the descriptive name 
‘virtue’ as ‘that complex naturalistically specifiable property of all and only those enduring 
human mental qualities manifestations of which give to a (human) spectator (i.e., to us)9 a 
pleasing sentiment of approbation’.10 This property of properties, according to Hume, is the 
property a mental quality has if and only if it is useful or agreeable to the person himself or to 
others. But this identity is only a posteriori discoverable. So that a mental quality possesses 
the property of being useful or agreeable to its possessor or others does not conceptually 
entail that it possesses the property of virtue. But it is knowable a priori that if two mental 
properties have all the same naturalistically defined properties, one of these possesses the 
property of virtue if the other does. All of this follows from the assumption that ‘virtue’ is a 
descriptive name of a property of mental qualities, a priori linked to the description ‘the 
complex naturalistically specifiable property of all and only those human mental qualities 
which give to a spectator (to us) the pleasing sentiment of approbation’, and that this 
description in fact denotes.11 
 
9 The first-person (plural) indexical here is essential. See Perry (1979). 
10 Note that this description, though it embeds an indexical, is not a rigid designator. 
11 According to Hume the moral sentiments of approbation and disapprobation are particular 
pleasures and pains caused by the contemplation of human characters. Not all pleasures and 
pains are the same. The pleasure arising from the contemplation of virtue is different from 
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 So I propose, Blackburn’s challenge to the realist can be met by a Humean 
sentimentalist.  
 The above is a way of spelling out the Yablo/Dohrn thought that moral predicates are 
response-enabled and it is also in line with and spells out Wright’s thought in his review of 
Blackburn’s Spreading the World (1985: 316): ‘moral qualities admit of an odd kind of 
variable realization; they are constrained to be whatever natural properties they turn out, a 
posteriori, to be’. Another anticipation is Noonan’s (1987: 84-5) remark: 
‘One simple-minded form of naturalism is that good (applied to an action, character or 
person) means ‘such as to elicit approval from human beings (or ‘from us’) and ‘bad’ 
means ‘such as to elicit disapproval from human beings (us)’. Suppose instead that 
‘good’ means ‘possesses a combination of natural properties which in the actual 
 
that arising from contemplation of an inanimate object (a beautiful sunset) (Hume 1978: 471). 
The pain arising from awareness of the good qualities of an enemy (courage, intelligence 
etc.,) is not the pain of disapprobation (Hume 1978: 472). The sentiments of approbation and 
disapprobation are those arising when a ‘character is considered in general, without reference 
to our particular interest’. Approbation and disapprobation are also distinguished from other 
pleasures and pains by the fact that they invariable lead to pride and humility (in ourselves) 
and love and hatred (towards others). They are caused by the contemplation of character traits 
by the mechanism of sympathy. Virtuous traits produce pleasurable feelings in their 
possessors or other in their circle (either mediately or through their utility). Observers are 
infected (as we may be infected by disease) via sympathy by these pleasurable feelings and 
thus approve of the virtuous traits. Sympathy is a mechanism which converts ideas into 
impressions and hence the ideas of the passions of others’ passions into passions. I become 
aware of someone’s grief from his behaviour and thus arrive at the idea of (and belief in) that 
emotion. This is then converted into an impression and ‘acquires such a degree of force and 
vivacity to become itself a passion’ (Hume 1978: 317). This is because our impression of 
ourselves has an unparalleled degree of vivacity and is ‘always intimately present with us… 
Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of 
conception’. However, if one does not like this Humean story (how could one not?), for our 
purposes it does not matter. Blackburn himself, as an expressivist, needs accounts of 




world elicits approval from human beings (us)’.  …. Then the moral will be barely 
supervenientc [conceptually supervenient] on the natural.
12 
 One final point to close this section. The fact that ‘virtue’ has been defined as a 
descriptive name, hence a rigid designator, should not be overemphasized. That it is so 
defined has no role in the explanation given of the bare conceptual supervenience of the 
moral on the natural which is Blackburn’s explanandum – obviously, since it is only bare 
conceptual supervenience.13  So why was it so defined? Simply because ‘virtue’ (like ‘the 
oval’ and ‘heat’) is a rigid designator.14 This is just a fact of language, just as it is a fact that 
‘Aristotle’ is a rigid designator. So if the suggested account is correct, its meaning is indeed 
 
12 Other anticipations are Davies and Humberstone’s (1980) discussion of Evan’s work where 
the possibility that moral predicates are descriptive names is sketched, but without reference 
to Blackburn’s challenge and Dreir (2000) where in Section III C the possibility that moral 
terms and also names of natural kinds are rigidified descriptions is sketched as a way the 
nonreductive naturalist can respond to Blackburn, but without distinguishing the cases (as is 
argued in Section IV below must be done), and without specifying the reference-fixing 
description which stands to ‘goodness’ as ‘the transparent, potable liquid found in our seas 
and rivers’ stands to ‘water’ (according to Kripke and Putnam). Dreir’s main proposal is that 
moral predicates be thought of as having an indexical component; this is along the lines of 
Noonan’s (1987) suggestion and the present one. 
13 It is not a priori that being an acquaintance of WLJ entails being an acquaintance of the 
inventor of the zip, but if two people have the same acquaintances, one is an acquaintance of 
the inventor of the zip if the other is.  
 14Of course, given that ‘Julius’ is rigid we can also say that if Tom is in fact acquainted with 
Julius then if Dick had had the same acquaintances as Tom in fact has, Dick would have been 
acquainted with Julius. Likewise, given that ‘virtue’ is rigid we can say that since St Francis 
was virtuous if someone had had (counterfactually) all the natural qualities St Francis had 
(historically) he would also have been virtuous. It is the truth of this counterfactual which is 
the datum that convinces philosophers that interworld supervenience must be the 
explanandum in Blackburn’s challenge. But one can accept the datum whilst rejecting 
interworld supervenience, or even the intelligibility of its statement. 
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response-enabled but not response-dependent one. Morality is objective (given the rigidity),15 
but contextual (due to the indexicality of the defining reference-fixing description).16 
IV 
 
15 Since, for example, ‘eating fish is wrong (the manifestation of a vicious character)’  and 
‘eating fish has a naturalistically specifiable characteristic which causes disapproval in us’, 
like ‘Julius is rich’ and ‘the inventor of the zip is rich’, differ in ingredient sense; they yield 
different results in modal and counterfactual contexts. So if eating fish is wrong it would still 
have been wrong if we had been differently psychologically constituted and approved of it. 
However, the sentences have the same assertoric content. So, if I sincerely assert the first you 
can correctly state, ‘He believes that eating fish has (some or other) natural characteristic 
which causes disapproval in himself and his circle’. My belief is a belief about me, but also 
others and features of the world. 
16 A challenge for such an account is to explain what appear to be genuine disagreements 
between two speakers affirming and denying a moral assertion. This lies off our track, but I 
will say a little. It is important that the reference-fixing description contains the first-person 
plural pronoun. The reference of the first-person singular pronoun is automatically secured as 
the speaker, but this not so for the plural form. So you and I can make the same reference 
using ‘we/us’. This is similar to the case with ‘here’. It is tempting to say that ‘here’ means: 
where I am. But there is no one place where I am, so two people can refer to the same place 
using ‘here’. Hence there can be genuine disagreement if one says ‘It is F here’ and the other 
says ‘It is not F here’ (e.g., if they have just checked into a hotel and are discussing whether 
‘Breakfast is served here from 6.00a.m.’). But there need not be genuine disagreement (if, for 
example, they are talking on the phone across different continents and one says ‘It is hot 
here’ and the other says, ‘It is not hot here’). The same is true on the account suggested for 
one person’s utterance of the form ‘X-ing is wrong’ and another’s of the form ‘X-ing is not 
wrong’. If I am discussing vegetarianism with my daughter and she says, ‘Eating fish is 
wrong’ and I say ‘Eating fish is not wrong’ there may be genuine disagreement (because our 
uses of the first-person plural would have a common reference). But perhaps there will not be 
if I am in conversation with a reincarnated mediaeval Samurai (who has been given a fast 




In this final section I want to respond to a worry and then conclude. 
 The worry is that the account given is too good. We can equally well, using the 
procedure sketched, explain the bare conceptual supervenience of the mental on the physical, 
or of our layman’s classificatory scheme of manifest kinds on the chemical. But in these 
cases there is not bare conceptual supervenience. Hence the procedure must be flawed since it 
can be used to ‘explain’ non-facts. 
 The mental is not conceptually supervenient on the physical. Someone, call him 
Descartes, who does not rule out the possibility of a mental difference between physically 
indiscernible things may be old-fashioned and wrong, but he does not thereby prove himself 
to be incompetent in the use of mental vocabulary. But if ‘pain’, say, can be defined as a 
descriptive name with its reference fixed as ‘that physical property of individuals which …’             
then he is. But the answer, of course, is that ‘pain’ cannot be so defined – as shown by the 
fact that Descartes’ use of mental vocabulary does not display conceptual incompetence. 
 Again, it is surely correct that what manifest kind something belongs to – water, gold 
etc., – is not conceptually supervenient on its chemical characterization. It does  not display 
incompetence in the use of this vocabulary if one allows that possibility that things might 
differ in manifest kind at the macroscopic level though chemically indistinguishable 
(indistinguishable at the level of chemical description). But again all this shows is that 
‘water’, say, is not a descriptive name coreferential with the description ‘the chemical  kind 
whose instances fill our seas, rivers etc.,’. It is not even the case, I would say, that it displays 
incompetence in the use of everyday vocabulary for manifest kinds if one allows the 
possibility that two samples of stuff which are macroscopically manifestly different cannot be 
told apart in any microscopic terms. The same is true of secondary quality terms (hence why I 
said previously that I consider the proposal that they are descriptive names of physical 
properties of objects merely hypothetical). Consider the supposition that there is a substance 
as sweet as sugar which is found, by giving minute samples to human tasters, to be a mixture 
of two types of substance, one twice as sweet as sugar, the other tasteless. However, no way 
can be found to identify the type of a sample without appeal to human tasters, and this 
inability is absolute – nothing ever could be done to distinguish the types expect by the 
involvement of human tasters. Someone who entertains this supposition is profoundly at odds 
with our modern Western world view, but I do not think that entertaining it proves a failure to 
grasp the very meaning of ‘sweet’. Hence names of secondary qualities are not descriptive 
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names of microscopically specifiable physical features of objects and it is not a conceptual 
truth that secondary qualities are supervenient on microscopically identifiable physical 
properties. 
 But the case of moral terms is very different. The supposition that two people might in 
all naturalistic respects be indistinguishable yet one be evil and the other good is one we can 
simply do nothing with. Someone who makes it does reveal himself to be incompetent in the 
use of moral terms. So to accept the proposed account of the meanings of moral terms as 
descriptive names of natural properties does not commit one to making analogous claims 
about terms for secondary qualities, manifest kinds or mental properties. The moral realist 
can distinguish this case from the others. 
 Conclusion; the datum which Blackburn identifies is one that can be specified without 
appeal to anything other than epistemic modality: it is a priori knowable that there is no  
moral difference without a natural difference but there is no a priori knowable route from 
satisfaction of any naturalistic predicate to satisfaction of a moral predicate. The first half of 
this claim can be called the thesis of the ascriptive supervenience of the moral on the natural 
(Klagge 1988). It embodies a constraint of conceptual competence on the user of moral 
predicates. The problem for the realist is to retain his basic semantic claim, qua realist, that 
moral predicates refer to moral properties, whilst accommodating the fact of ascriptive 
supervenience of the moral on the natural along with the lack of conceptual entailment from 
(an a priori route from) naturalistic predicates to moral predicates. That requires a semantic 
link between moral predicates and natural ones. My suggestion is that by regarding the 
meaning of moral predicates as derivative from the meaning of moral terms, and regarding 
the latter as descriptive names whose references are fixed by descriptions whose meanings 
include that they are descriptions of natural properties this semantic link is secured. 
Specifically, on the Humean sentimentalist proposal sketched ‘is a virtuous mental quality’ 
means ‘is a mental quality possessing virtue’ and ‘virtue’ is a descriptive name of the second-
level natural property possessed by a mental quality which gives to a spectator (one of us) the 
pleasing sentiment of approbation. But this as a matter of empirical fact is the natural 
property of being useful or agreeable to its possessor or others. So the moral is barely 
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